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I. INTRODUCTION
Retroactivity rules in state post-conviction proceedings, although
seemingly technical and arcane, affect countless lives and implicate
important questions of judicial federalism. This Article argues that
state courts can and should provide a forum to vindicate federal constitutional rights for state prisoners whose convictions are already final, even—or especially—when federal courts refuse relief. While recent Supreme Court rulings have eased the limits on retroactive relief
for new “substantive” rules that redefine classes of defendants or the

* Founding Partner of Deutsch Hunt PLLC. This Article was written while a Supervising Attorney and Clinical Teaching Fellow at the Georgetown Appellate Litigation Program. My thanks to the participants in the 2015 Georgetown Summer Workshop for their
patience with a preliminary draft and valuable feedback. I am especially grateful to Dori
Bernstein, William Buzbee, Steven Goldblatt, Vicki Jackson, Mike Seidman, Carlos
Vazquez, and David Vladeck for talking through the seeds of this project with me; to Steve
Vladeck and Matt Scarola for very thoughtful written comments; and to Thanh Nguyen and
the Georgetown Law Library research team for assisting with the research on state retroactivity cases post-Danforth.
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elements of the underlying criminal conduct, 1 retroactive relief remains elusive for new rules of criminal procedure that are announced
only after a criminal defendant’s conviction becomes final. 2
In the quarter-century that has elapsed since the governing federal
retroactivity regime was announced in Teague v. Lane, 3 the Court has
yet to permit the retroactive application of a new criminal procedural
rule announced after a conviction has become final, even in federal
cases where there are no independent sovereigns to respect, 4 and even
when the death penalty is on the line. 5
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Danforth v. Minnesota,6 which
offered a glimmer of hope for state prisoners to secure post-conviction
relief based on new rules of criminal procedure. Danforth freed state
courts to craft their own retroactive remedies and permitted them to
be more generous than their federal counterparts. 7 It did so by delinking the newly announced rule, a question of federal law, from the distinct question of whether a retroactive remedy was available, a proce-

1. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259-60 (2016) (holding that the decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which determined that the definition of prior “violent felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)
was unconstitutionally vague under due process principles, announced a substantive rule
that applied retroactively on collateral review); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
734 (2016) (holding that the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), prohibiting
Eighth Amendment mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders, announced
a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review).
2. A note on terminology: By ‘final,’ I am using the working doctrinal definition that
the direct review process of the state conviction—trial, any state appeals, and any petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court—has concluded. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
321 n.6 (1987) (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed
or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”). Later in the argument, I note that there are some
types of claims which, because they can be fully and fairly adjudicated for the first time only
in post-conviction proceedings, are not truly final until after the completion of at least the
state collateral review process and Supreme Court review of state post-conviction proceedings. I refer to these claims as ‘initial review post-conviction’ claims. By ‘new constitutional
rules,’ I mean federal constitutional rules that are newly announced after a conviction becomes final.
3. 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013) (holding that in a
federal habeas case, the rule in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2009), requiring defense
counsel to advise the defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea, was
a new rule of criminal procedure that did not apply retroactively).
5. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment jury right for capital sentencing that was announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002), was properly classified as procedural rather than substantive, was not a watershed
procedural rule, and thus did not apply to death penalty cases already final on direct review).
6. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
7. Id. at 280-81.

2016]

FEDERALIZING RETROACTIVITY RULES

55

dural question governed by state law in state post-conviction proceedings and federal law in federal habeas proceedings. 8 Post-Danforth,
therefore, states are empowered to provide retroactive relief in their
own post-conviction proceedings, even when federal courts would be
barred from doing so under Teague.9 And just this past Term, the Court
clarified that although states can be more generous than federal habeas
courts in applying new rules retroactively, they cannot be stingier.10
While Danforth endorsed state courts’ authority to be more generous than federal courts in providing retroactive collateral relief, Montgomery confirmed that such flexibility is one-sided only. 11 An important role thus remains for federal oversight to ensure that, at least
for substantive federal rights, which require retroactive application in
federal court, retroactive relief is also available in state post-conviction
proceedings. Federal retroactivity rules thus establish a baseline for
the availability of retroactive relief based on new substantive criminal
rules, under which the states cannot fall. Part A below, therefore, provides an overview of the evolution of the federal retroactivity regime,
which involves both judge-made restrictions to relief first announced
by the Court in Teague, as well as additional barriers to relief engrafted by Congress in 1996 with the enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 12
Against this backdrop, Part B analyzes the Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in Danforth v. Minnesota and its aftermath in the states. A
survey of state court rulings post-Danforth shows that many states,
including Minnesota itself, on remand in Danforth, 13 have declined to
abandon the much-criticized Teague regime.14 Although a smattering
of states have taken up the offer to be more generous in providing ret-

8. Id.
9. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989).
10. See supra note 1. Notably, Montgomery applies only to new substantive rules. It
does not address whether state courts would be bound by any Supreme Court determination
that a new procedural rule should be applied retroactively, probably because, at least since
Teague was decided, the Court has never announced a new rule protecting criminal procedural rights that has been given retroactive application. See also Colin Starger, Doctrinal
Desert: A Watershed in Sight?, IN PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2015), blogs.ubalt.edu/cstarger/
2015/10/.../doctrinal-desert-a-watershed-in-sight [https://perma.cc/T3DR-77QB].
11. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
13. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499-500 (Minn. 2009).
14. Georgetown University Law Library Research Services, 50-State Survey of State
Court Retroactivity Regimes (June 12, 2015) (unpublished survey) (on file with author)
[hereinafter GULL Survey]; see also Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4a, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2015) (No. 14-280) (describing state
retroactivity regimes and corroborating survey results).
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roactive relief, the vast majority remain wedded to the Teague analysis.15 I argue that such a wooden or reflexive adoption of crabbed federal retroactivity restrictions by state courts simply makes no sense.
Comity concerns that underpin federal habeas courts’ reluctance to
disturb state court convictions do not arise when a state court is tasked
with determining the legality of its own convictions, and finality concerns are overstated and outweighed by the increasingly pressing social need to remedy illegal convictions and detentions. Finality concerns are also more equitably and directly served by other constraints
on collateral relief such as statutes of limitations and procedural bars.
Part C argues that state courts can and should make the effort to
extract themselves from Teague’s gravitational pull. Particularly
when state courts are the only forum available for vindicating a federal
right—a right that Danforth clarified has always existed and is
“found,” rather than “made,” when it disentangled the question of the
right’s existence from the separate question of availability of a remedy—state courts have a constitutional obligation to provide relief.
Such an obligation is especially strong for those claims that can be
heard for the first time only in post-conviction proceedings (initial review collateral claims), such as ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
on appeal claims, or newly-minted Brady 16 claims that emerge only
after a conviction is final.
Where the Teague bar and AEDPA constraints prevent federal
courts from offering relief, state courts must step in to fill that remedial void. Once the state court forum exists, it is constitutionally obligated to vindicate federal rights. Affording state prisoners post-conviction relief when their conviction or sentence is revealed to have resulted from unconstitutional procedures or invalidated crimes or penalties, moreover, provides one indirect, yet potentially powerful means
to ameliorate the mass incarceration crisis. While sentencing reforms
and other measures work on the front end to reduce the number of new
prisoners, such reforms leave largely untouched the sentences of those
15. GULL Survey, supra note 14, at 1-3 (stating that five states—Alaska, Florida, Missouri, Utah, and West Virginia—have affirmatively chosen not to apply Teague, and instead
have adopted some variant of the policy-based approach that preceded Teague, announced
by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965)); see Brief for the
U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 14, at 10a (listing State v. Smart,
202 P.3d 1130, 1136-38, 1140 (Alaska 2009); Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 960-61
(Fla. 2015); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 267-68 (Mo. 2003); Labrum v. Utah State Bd.
of Pardons, 870 P.3d 902, 911-12 (Utah 1993); and State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 923-24
(W. Va. 2012)). The Alaska Supreme Court presaged the rule announced this past term in
Montgomery and uses Teague as a floor, applying its own Linkletter variant established in
Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971), but only after “confirm[ing] that Judd is no less
protective than the [Teague] standard.” Smart, 202 P.3d at 1138-39.
16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that it violates the Due Process
Clause for the prosecution to withhold exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt
or punishment).

2016]

FEDERALIZING RETROACTIVITY RULES

57

already convicted. Breaking free from the yoke of Teague and providing retroactive relief for new criminal procedural rules where the Supreme Court refuses to do so offers a pathway towards addressing
mass incarceration on the back end by refusing to let unconstitutional
convictions or sentences stand.
In hopes of fostering such developments, this Article concludes in
Part D by urging the criminal defense bar to more aggressively seek
retroactive relief in state post-conviction proceedings. This can be done
both by challenging state courts’ wooden application of the inapposite
Teague procedural bar and by urging those state courts that purport
to be bound by Teague to be more generous than their federal counterparts in how they manipulate the extremely malleable categories for
classifying newly-announced federal rules. Questions such as whether
a rule is even truly new or merely an application of an old rule,
whether a rule should be classified as substantive or procedural, and
whether, even if procedural, a rule might nonetheless be considered a
watershed rule that is retroactively applicable are all questions that a
state can decide for itself under Danforth and that allow a state court
to award retroactive relief even when such relief was denied by the
Supreme Court.17
This practice coda urges state prisoners and their attorneys to
make the admittedly extraordinary effort to seek certiorari review of
state post-conviction rulings if relief is denied at the state level, even
though procedural obstacles are abundant, and even though the
chances of certiorari are slim. Given the erosion of federal habeas review resulting from the constraints of AEDPA deference and the impossibility of evolving constitutional law after Teague, the best hope of
shaping favorable new constitutional criminal protections on questions not yet resolved by the Supreme Court is to directly challenge
unfavorable state retroactivity rulings.

A. Teague, AEDPA, and the Erosion of Federal Habeas Relief for
State Prisoners
Of the more than 1.5 million prisoners incarcerated in the United
States, some 90% are state or local prisoners, many serving sentences
spanning decades. 18 What happens to these prisoners when the Supreme Court decides a case yielding a ‘new’ constitutional rule, which
17. Of course, under Montgomery, if the Supreme Court deems a new rule substantive
and retroactively applicable, that decision is binding on the state courts. See supra note 1.
18. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 (2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN82-BTUT]; see also Marc
Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2015, at
SR6 (arguing that mass incarceration needs to be dismantled one state at a time and noting
that ninety percent of those incarcerated are in state or local facilities).
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if applied to a prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, would render it unconstitutional or at least constitutionally suspect? In the vast
majority of cases, state prisoners already serving their sentences are
unable to obtain relief from the federal courts, even when they remain
incarcerated as a result of undisputed constitutional violations.

1. Retroactivity in the Warren Court
This was not always the case.19 But as the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants expanded, along with the willingness of federal
courts to reverse state convictions on habeas review, automatic retroactive application of new judicial rules was retracted during the Warren Court. 20 Under the much-criticized Linkletter/Stovall regime, the
availability of retroactive relief or a newly announced criminal rule,
whether on direct or collateral review, turned on case-by-case retroactivity determinations. 21 These ad hoc retroactivity decisions reflected
the struggles of a divided Court to deal with the practical effects of the
criminal “rights revolution,” during a period when federal habeas
courts played an active role in reviewing and overturning already final
state convictions. 22 Some have argued that the Court’s reluctance to
allow retroactive remedies for already final convictions was precisely
what provided the Court with the continued freedom to expand the
constitutional rights available to criminal defendants. 23
To “settle what has become a most troublesome question in the administration of justice,” certiorari was granted in Linkletter to decide
whether the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio 24 applied

19. Until the retraction of retroactive relief by the Warren Court, a reaction to the ‘rights
revolution’ and concern with the effect of the explosion of new procedural rights on undoing
already-final convictions, the default regime was that judicial decisions “had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.” Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
20. ‘Warren Court’ refers to the Supreme Court decisions between 1953 and 1969, when Earl
Warren was Chief Justice. See History of the Court, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_warren.html [https://perma.cc/V5HN-7UD7].
21. The retroactivity regime for judge-made law in civil cases evolved separately and is
not the subject of this Article. Discussions can be found in Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997) and Harold J.
Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO.
L.J. 2143 (1996).
22. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (announcing a de novo standard of review
of legal questions on federal habeas); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Habeas as Forum
Allocation: A New Synthesis, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 645 (2017) (describing the evolution of the
Brown v. Allen standard and its role in shifting de novo habeas review from the Supreme
Court to the lower federal courts).
23. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 99 (1999).
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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retroactively to cases decided before Mapp. 25 After first declaring that
the Constitution had nothing to say about retroactivity one way or the
other,26 Linkletter held that to determine the retroactivity of a given
criminal rule, the Court must “weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation.” 27 This is not very clear guidance, to say the least. The
exclusionary rule did not apply retroactively to litigants other than
Mapp himself, the Court ruled, because to do so would “tax the administration of justice to the utmost.” 28 The Court further justified this
outcome by noting that “the fairness of the trial [was] not under attack,” only “the admissibility of evidence, the reliability and relevancy
of which is not questioned . . . .” 29
In Stovall v. Denno, 30 the Court refined the Linkletter analysis. 31
The retroactivity regime that governed thereafter for criminal
judge-made rules was based on three fairly subjective and policyladen criteria, which applied to direct appeals and habeas cases
alike: “[1] the purpose to be served by the new [rule], [2] the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old [rule], and
[3] the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new [rule].” 32
Over time, Justice Harlan refined a dissenting view, arguing that
application of the three-part test was unpredictable and yielded inconsistent results. 33 He insisted that “ ‘retroactivity’ must be rethought.”34
And so it was.
25. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965).
26. Id. at 629.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 637.
29. Id. at 639. This unwillingness to enforce the exclusionary rule continued. E.g., Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (finding no federal habeas remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations).
30. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
31. Id. at 300 (refusing to apply retroactively the rule announced in Wade v. United States,
358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966), regarding the pre-trial right to counsel under this approach).
32. Id. at 297.
33. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Desist argued against purely prospective application of new rules (while making an
exception only for the litigant at bar) and also began advocating for non-retroactivity as the
general rule in collateral proceedings, without “pretend[ing] to have exhausted . . . all the complexities of the retroactivity problem on habeas.” Id. at 258, 268. His later opinion in Mackey
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), elaborated on his reasons for why direct review cases
required full retroactivity, while habeas cases used a more circumscribed approach. See
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.
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2. The Current Federal Regime: Complete Retroactivity for Direct Appeals and General Non-Retroactivity for Collateral Review
In 1987, the Court began its incremental move towards adopting
Justice Harlan’s proposed approach. Griffith v. Kentucky 35 set the
still-governing standard for cases on direct review: New criminal rules
apply to all litigants whose convictions were not yet final at the time
the new rule was announced, such that similarly situated defendants
were treated similarly. 36 Seemingly disavowing its view in Linkletter
that retroactivity was not constitutionally mandated, the Court asserted, without further explanation, that a failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to similarly situated defendants whose
cases were on direct appeal “violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” 37
As for cases already final and reviewable only through post-conviction proceedings, the other shoe of Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity dropped two years later. In 1989, Teague v. Lane announced
the general rule that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced.” 38 Since Teague, state prisoners whose
convictions have become final are extremely unlikely to obtain relief
from criminal procedural rules that were announced in decisions
which post-date their convictions.39 Teague also had the effect of freezing the development of constitutional law for criminal defendants by
holding that federal habeas courts had to rule on retroactivity as a
threshold issue and could not reach the merits once it was determined
that no retroactive relief was available.40 Timing is now everything.

35. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
36. Id. at 328.
37. Id. at 322.
38. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). The Teague regime largely adopted the retroactivity rules
that Justice Harlan had advocated for in his separate opinions in the Mackey and Desist
cases decided under the Linkletter/Stovall regime. Id. at 304-07. For general background on
retroactivity rules and theories of judging, see, for example, Fisch, supra note 21 and Matthew P. Harrington, Foreword: The Dual Dichotomy of Retroactive Lawmaking, 3 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 19 (1997). See also Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (1965) (advocating for the approach urged by Justice Harlan and ultimately fully adopted in Teague).
39. See generally Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane

Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity
of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2005); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23; see also
Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach to Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” Exception to Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2009).
40. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-01; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1746; James
S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 567-76 (1991).

2016]

FEDERALIZING RETROACTIVITY RULES

61

This rethinking of retroactivity, however, did not resolve the problem of inconsistent results that plagued the Linkletter/Stovall regime.
It just created a different set of problems. To be sure, inconsistencies
no longer hinge so blatantly on a reviewing court’s policy-based decision as to whether anyone but the defendant at bar should benefit from
the new rule. Now, the vagaries of timing, differences in lawyering
skills, and duration of state procedures control. For two people convicted of the same crime on the same day, under procedures later revealed as unconstitutional, the availability of relief from a federal
court turns on whether they can claim the benefit of the new rule before their convictions become final. 41 Thus, the longer your appeal
takes, the more likely you are to benefit from a favorable change in the
law. And, the Teague categories are arguably just as fuzzy as the Linkletter/Stovall three-factor test. Under Teague, courts apply extremely
malleable classifications that have evolved over the years to shrink the
possibilities of federal habeas relief.
But before explaining how Teague operates, a few words on its underlying premises are in order. Underpinning the general rule against
collateral retroactivity advocated by Justice Harlan and legal scholars
of the time, like Professors Mishkin and Bater, and adopted by Teague,
were principles of comity—or deference to state courts—and a reluctance to second-guess or disturb state convictions that were “correct,”
i.e., applied the then-governing constitutional doctrine, at the time
they were originally made. 42 This foundation reflects an inherently
crabbed view of the underlying purposes of habeas corpus relief, which
is to assure that courts of first instance follow the right rules (rather
than ensure that they get the right result), such that habeas courts
“need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the
time the original proceedings took place” in order to fairly exercise
their function of deterring state procedural violations. 43 As long as
state courts ‘toed the line,’ it did not matter if the line they were toeing
was later revealed to have been poorly drawn. Scholars at the time
went so far as to argue that federal plenary review was demoralizing
to state court judges.44 Likewise, underpinning the Teague regime is
41. See Entzeroth, supra note 39, at 161-62.
42. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1746-49 (discussing the evolution of the
Teague rule and its underlying premises); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give

Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2009); Liebman, supra note 40, at 603-04.
43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist v. United States,

394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969)).
44. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963) (“I could imagine nothing more subversive of a
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an overriding concern for protecting the finality of criminal judgments
as an end wholly apart from federalism concerns, but especially because of a reluctance to impose greater costs on states by disturbing
already settled judgments. 45
Under Teague, the first step in the analysis is to decide whether a
rule is “new” or not, as the retroactivity of the Court’s criminal procedure decisions “turn[s] on whether they are novel.” 46 If a habeas petitioner can convince a court that the newly announced decision does not
create a new rule at all, but rather is merely an application of an existing rule, then there is no retroactivity problem. Over the years, however, the Court has expanded its framing of what constitutes a new
rule, making it increasingly difficult to argue that a case is simply applying an existing framework to new facts.47
The next escape route from Teague’s general prohibition on retroactive relief is to argue that the rule is substantive rather than procedural, meaning it “places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’ ” 48 This rarely happens, and examples of substantive ‘exceptions’ to Teague’s bar on retroactive application of new criminal procedural rules have, at least until the recent rulings in Montgomery and
Welch, been few and far between. 49

judge’s sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential
a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the
notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else.”).
45. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10.
46. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
47. “ ‘[A] case announces a new rule . . . when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation’ on the government” and when “the result was not dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
After Teague, the Court further expanded the range of a new rule, explaining that a holding
is not dictated by precedent unless it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”
Id. (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)). In another formulation, the
Court has stated that, to decide whether a rule is new, the question is “whether a state court
considering [the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the
Constitution.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
48. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Substantive rules “decriminalize a
class of conduct [or] prohibit the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of persons.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.
49. While courts and scholars sometimes refer to the retroactivity of substantive rules
on collateral relief as an exception to the Teague retroactivity bar, in Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998), the Court explained that “Teague by its terms applies only
to procedural rules,” (redefining element of a crime substantive rule that is retroactive). Indeed, well before Teague, the Court had recognized the principal that an intervening change
in substantive law requires retroactive application on collateral appeal. See Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974); see also Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?,
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Finally, the last way out of the Teague bar, one that has never been
satisfied in federal court (even in the capital sentencing context), permits retroactive application of “those procedures that . . . are ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,’ ” 50 and that announce a “ ‘watershed
rule[] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 51 Although the Supreme Court
has yet to find a new procedural rule to be watershed, and has in fact
strongly suggested that it may never do so, 52 it has observed in dicta
that Gideon v. Wainwright 53 would probably qualify if decided today.54
Criticisms of the Court’s steadfast refusal to ever conclude that a new
rule satisfies this exception are deserved and many. 55 Given the
Court’s failure to find any new procedural rules sufficiently fundamental to qualify for retroactive effect, even those that constitute structural error and are automatic grounds for reversal on direct appeal,
the Teague regime is perhaps best described as allowing only new substantive rules retroactive effect in federal collateral proceedings. 56
In sum, the norm under Teague is that state prisoners serving already final sentences will, more often than not, find no recourse from
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1806, 1820 (2003). Prohibitions on executions of classes of defendants announced in decisions such as Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (no death
penalty for child rape), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (no death penalty for juveniles), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (no death penalty for the mentally retarded) would also count as substantive rules not barred by the Teague non-retroactivity
regime. This past Term the Court declared two other rules to be substantive, and therefore,
not barred by Teague. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
50. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
51. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). Supreme Court cases
denying state habeas petitioners the benefit of new procedural rules are numerous and
troubling in that they display the Court’s willingness to deny a remedy to people, including
people on death row, whose convictions or sentences are constitutionally suspect. See, e.g.,
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1103 (holding the Sixth Amendment violation for IAC in Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), did not apply retroactively); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S.
406, 421 (2007) (denying retroactive remedy for confrontation clause Sixth Amendment
rights announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) for the same reasons);
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-58 (2004) (declining to give retroactive relief on
federal habeas review to a state death row prisoner because the constitutional rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)—that aggravating factors in a death sentencing case had to be proved to a jury not a judge—was a new procedural rule that was
not “watershed”).
52. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417-18.
53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (stating that Gideon is “the only case that we have identified as qualifying under this exception . . . .”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1298 (7th ed. 2015).
55. See supra note 37.
56. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 54, at 1299.
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federal habeas courts when constitutional rules change in their favor.
Their federal rights will not be vindicated although governing constitutional decisions show they have been imprisoned based on unconstitutional procedures, even when they are serving sentences that are
constitutionally suspect, including death sentences or mandatory sentences that were imposed under sentencing regimes now recognized
as unconstitutional.

3. Is Teague Even Necessary After AEDPA?
Teague remains a barrier to federal habeas relief, even though
many of the comity and finality concerns that originally motivated its
imposition of a general non-retroactivity rule for federal habeas proceedings have subsequently been addressed by what has been dubbed
as “surely one of the worst statutes ever passed by Congress and
signed into law by a President,” 57 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 58 The finality concerns that underpinned Teague, for example, are largely ameliorated by the combined effect of a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of federal
habeas petitions that can be equitably tolled only in the most extraordinary of circumstances,59 AEDPA’s own anti-retroactivity rules, 60
and a prohibition of nearly all second or successive habeas petitions.61
Any reluctance to second-guess state court judgments that Teague
addressed through an unyielding bar on collateral retroactive relief for
57. Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER
(June 21, 2015), http://www newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights
[https://perma.cc/9V3F-7FJC].
58. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924
(2013) (holding that actual innocence can serve as a gateway to pass through expiration of
statute of limitations); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling).
Federal prisoners who file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to take
advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will thus usually be time-barred, except in
those rare cases where the Supreme Court “announces a new rule of constitutional law and
makes it retroactive within one year.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (emphasis added). State prisoners face this same result. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)
(2012); § 2244(b)(2)(A); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 591 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Ryan
W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE
FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y 179, 188 nn.37-40 (2014) (describing all the finality-saving devices
of AEDPA, other than retroactivity restrictions).
60. Relief is available only for state court rulings “contrary to or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of clearly established . . . law.” § 2254(d)(1).
61. Still unresolved by the Court is whether AEDPA fully codifies Teague, including the
Teague exceptions, see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 n.* (2011), and whether Teague
even applies to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief under AEDPA § 2255, an argument
that the Chaidez court declined to address. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103,
1113 n.16 (2013). As discussed more fully below, if AEDPA in fact supplants Teague entirely,
including nullifying the Teague exceptions, that is all the more reason for state courts to
hear claims which constitutionally require review and would otherwise have no forum.
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criminal procedural rules is now more directly satisfied by AEDPA’s
extreme deference to state courts’ rulings. AEDPA replaced the Brown
v. Allen 62 regime, under which federal habeas courts reviewed questions of law de novo, with a rule that federal courts reviewing state
court convictions must let even constitutionally erroneous rulings
stand so long as those rulings are not objectively unreasonable.63
AEDPA requires that “[a] state court . . . be granted a deference and
latitude that are not in operation” in the circumstances of normal appellate review.64 Such extreme deference all but abdicates the review
function of the federal judiciary, because asking whether a state
court’s application of a legal standard is unreasonable is a far cry from
asking whether that standard was correctly applied. Even worse, federal habeas petitioners can find themselves between a rock and a hard
place in navigating around barriers to relief: for example, in seeking
to escape the Teague bar by arguing that a constitutional holding is
simply an application of already settled law, and not new, they may
then find themselves blocked by the statute of limitations. 65
In short, AEDPA has tied the hands of the federal judiciary, impeding them from correcting constitutional error, and leaving countless
state prisoners incarcerated or permitting their execution even when
state courts make constitutional errors in their convictions or sentences while applying the law at the time the decision was made. If
deemed not “unreasonable,” constitutionally wrong decisions are left
standing. 66 As Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has observed, this
“collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of
constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal
era.” 67 In the service of the hallowed and frequently hollow interests of
comity and finality, the federal courts’ power to vindicate federal
62. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
63. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussing the standard of
review of state court judgments under § 2254(d)(2)). Under AEDPA, federal judges sitting in
habeas may not grant relief “unless the [state court’s] adjudication of the claim . . . resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
64. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). In Harrington, the Court held that
federal habeas courts must defer to even unexplained state summary dispositions, reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief in an IAC claim. Id. at 113.
65. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103
(2013) (No. 11-820).
66. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 379.
67. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Im-

munity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1219, 1219 (2015).
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rights through operation of the ‘Great Writ’ has all but disappeared.
State courts can, and in some instances, arguably must step in to fill
the void. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. Minnesota
provided one means for them to do so.

B. The Unrealized Promise of Danforth v. Minnesota
1. Federal Retroactivity as a Floor, Not a Ceiling
Against this bleak landscape of the incredibly shrinking federal habeas remedy, a tiny glimmer of hope emerged in 2008. In a ruling that
surprised many at the time, the Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota 68 pronounced that Teague’s retroactivity rule was a remedial (and
therefore procedural) regime governing the availability of federal habeas relief and not a substantive federal choice of law rule that determines—in a manner binding upon state courts—the moment when
new constitutional rights emerge. 69 In other words, Danforth returned
to a ‘Blackstonian’ view of the world, where the proper interpretation
of the Constitution was discovered, not made, and the retroactivity
question boils down to whether or not a remedy should be available
when the correct rule is found.70
While preserving, and arguably entrenching the Teague remedial
framework for federal habeas courts, the Danforth majority released
the state courts from any wrongly perceived obligation to adhere to
Teague’s crabbed vision of the general unavailability of retroactive relief during collateral proceedings. As a result of this unraveling of the
constitutional rule from the retroactive remedy, state courts are now
free to provide post-conviction remedies to state prisoners in their own
courts based on ‘new’ federal rules, even when the federal courts are
barred from doing so under Teague.
Danforth arose when the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to apply Crawford’s Confrontation Clause holding retroactively in state
post-conviction proceedings, deeming itself bound by the Teague
framework.71 In 1996, Stephen Danforth was convicted in Minnesota
68. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
69. Id. at 288.
70. For a discussion of Danforth’s return to Blackstonian views of lawmaking (as opposed to legal realists’ recognition that judges make the law in response to changing circumstances), see, for example, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1734-58; Lasch, supra note
42, at 46-47; The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 431-35 (2008); and
Michael C. Dorf, Did Justice Stevens Pull a Fast One? The Hidden Logic of a Recent Retroactivity Case in the Supreme Court, FINDLAW (Feb. 25, 2008), http://supreme.findlaw.com/
legal-commentary/did-justice-stevens-pull-a-fast-one-the-hidden-logic-of-a-recentretroactivity-case-in-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/JZD7-6CRR].
71. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455-56 (Minn. 2006).
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state court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a child. In securing the conviction, the prosecutor relied on a videotaped interview
of the non-testifying victim. 72 It was only in 2004, after Danforth’s conviction became final, that the United States Supreme Court decided
Crawford v. Washington, 73 holding that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of testimonial, out-ofcourt statements unless the defendant has been able to cross-examine
the speaker. 74
Danforth sought relief under Crawford in state habeas proceedings.75 In denying post-conviction relief, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that even if the rule announced in Crawford were violated
in his trial, Danforth had no recourse because the state court was
bound to apply Teague. 76 Under Teague, Crawford was a new criminal
procedural rule that was not watershed, and therefore, unavailable to
a petitioner seeking retroactive relief in collateral proceedings.77
Stephen Danforth petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari, challenging the position of Minnesota’s highest court that it
was bound under federal law to apply Teague’s retroactivity framework. 78 And although Minnesota refused to join issue on this question
in its opposition to certiorari,79 the Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing at the certiorari stage––a very rare occurrence signaling a strong interest––and eventually granted certiorari on the question of whether state courts were bound to apply the Teague framework in their own post-conviction proceedings. 80 The grant of certiorari
was far from surprising, both because of the strong signal from the
unusual supplemental briefing request, and most significantly, because at the time the states were deeply divided on the question.81
72. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267.
73. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267.
76. Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 457.
77. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267-68. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s view of Crawford’s
non-retroactivity under Teague was consistent with that subsequently announced by the
Supreme Court in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007).
78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273).
79. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273).
80. See Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1,
Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273) (describing the letter from the Court requesting a
supplemental briefing).
81. See, e.g., Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane
on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 437-48 (1993); see also Jason Mazzone, Rights and Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1749, 1752-57
(2011) (describing the various state retroactivity regimes pre-Danforth).
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The resulting 7-2 decision in Danforth was authored by Justice Stevens; Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy. 82 After marching through the tortured history of retroactivity doctrine, the
majority opinion pronounced the retroactivity question to be one of
remedy alone, declaring that “the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily
a question of state law.” 83 Moreover, the Teague retroactivity bar was
inapposite, Justice Stevens confirmed, because “Teague speaks only to
the context of federal habeas,” 84 and “was fashioned to achieve the
goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state
criminal proceedings. . . . not to limit a state court’s authority to grant
relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing
its own State’s convictions.” 85
In a fairly dramatic reframing of retroactivity doctrine, moving
away from the realist recognition of the Warren era that the Court was
‘making’ new law and returning to Blackstone’s ‘declaratory’ theory of
judging, the majority opinion invoked the Blackstonian model as a
means of making the “shift from ‘retroactivity’ to ‘redressability.’ ” 86 By
casting the question of retroactivity as purely one of remedy, states
were free to follow their own procedures in determining whether and
when collateral relief should be available and were not bound by
Teague’s constricted framework, which was predicated in large part on
inapposite principles of comity and deference to state courts. 87
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy.88 The
dissent bemoaned the loss of federal supremacy and uniformity and
decried the majority’s relinquishment of the Court’s “role under the
Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its meaning
82. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 265.
83. Id. at 288.
84. Id. at 281.
85. Id. at 280-81.
86. Lasch, supra note 42, at 35.
87. Teague in no way “constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to
new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion.” Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266.
As noted above, the Court took pains to reserve the question of whether “States are required
to apply ‘watershed’ rules in state post-conviction proceedings.” Id. at 269 n.4. As there have
yet to be any watershed rules (with the exception of the post-hoc anointed Gideon v. Wainwright), this reservation was a bit like saying we do not decide whether the States can collect
the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. This same footnote also reserved the question of
whether Teague applies to federal prisoners and whether Congress can repeal the Teague
exceptions by statute. Both questions are still open as Montgomery v. Louisiana held only
that substantive rules must be applied retroactively by state and federal courts alike; it did
not address the null set of watershed procedural rules. Recall that the Court has yet to declare any procedural rule sufficiently watershed to be retroactive. See supra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
88. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291-311 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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and its reach, and the accompanying duty to ensure the uniformity of
that federal law.” 89 But this lament at lost uniformity rings hollow, as
federal habeas rarely yields the same result to similarly situated defendants across the country. As noted above, vagaries in the timing of
state appellate and collateral review processes as well as differences
in other state procedures, including those governing procedural default, already destroy the uniformity of results in federal habeas. 90
The Danforth dissent also planted the seed of buyers’ remorse, noting that if states are allowed more flexibility to be generous, they
should be allowed equal flexibility to deny relief even in the rare circumstances where a federal court would apply a new rule retroactively.91 But this past term, in Montgomery v. Louisiana,92 Justice
Kennedy wrote for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and
held that Danforth’s flexibility was one-way only: state courts are required to give retroactive effect to new federal substantive rules. 93 In
other words, federal retroactivity rules now establish a floor, not a ceiling: states may be more generous than federal courts in providing retroactive relief, but they may not be stingier.

2. Danforth’s Unrealized Promise
Commentators writing in the wake of the Danforth decision recognized that giving states greater freedom to remedy constitutional violations in post-conviction proceedings held promise for state prisoners,
providing an alternative forum to obtain relief that would otherwise
be denied by federal habeas courts under Teague.94 But the results of
89. Id. at 310.
90. Federal courts require exhaustion of state procedures and will not reach the merits
if a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
91. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 309-10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not see any basis in
the majority’s logic for concluding that States are free to hold our decisions retroactive when
we have held they are not, but not free to hold that they are not when we have held
they are.”).
92. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
93. Id. at 729. In doing so, the majority found itself in the odd position of having to rule
on the merits of the question presented in order to justify its own exercise of jurisdiction. In
order to defend its exercise of jurisdiction, it had to first find that the Miller rule was substantive, not procedural, and also decide that the retroactivity of substantive rules was a binding
question of federal law, not a state-controlled remedial question. That unusual jurisdictional
pivot is more fully addressed elsewhere. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905 (2017).
94. See e.g., Tom Cummins, Danforth v. Minnesota: The Confrontation Clause, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255 (2009); Dorf, supra note 70; Lasch,
supra note 42; Leading Cases, supra note 70, at 433-34 (arguing that Danforth’s remedial
focus potentially weakens the Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) absolute rule of full
retroactivity on direct review, because balancing is always appropriate in a remedial model);
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a fifty-state survey are disappointing, showing that Danforth’s promise remains largely unrealized.95
Teague holds sway despite Danforth’s recognition that the Teague
rule is grounded in comity concerns of federal habeas courts—concerns
with no bearing in state court post-conviction proceedings where a separate sovereign is operating in its own sphere and has plenary authority. Teague strangely remains the default rule in most states, perhaps
in even more than before Danforth was decided. Teague’s cancer, in
other words, has metastasized. Whether employed as a non-binding
standard that is nonetheless woodenly applied, the starting place that
ends up as an anchor weighing down any independent analysis (think
of the anchoring effect of ‘advisory’ federal sentencing guidelines), 96 or
an unthinking rule of thumb, Teague, a decision based on the unique
vision of the deferential role of federal habeas, is now coin of the realm.
The trajectory of Stephen Danforth’s own case proves as much. On
remand from the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth, Minnesota, although offered the road to freedom, opted to stick with the
Teague regime, finding it not to “be a perfect rule, but . . . preferable
to the alternatives.” 97 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Teague’s comity rationale had no bearing in state postconviction proceedings, but doubled down on Teague’s other stated
goal of serving finality.98 A purported “bright line” to guide litigants
was preferred to case-by-case assessment of the worth of retroactive
relief, particularly given the perceived difficulties and cost of reopening stale state convictions. 99 Other states have followed suit. For the
vast majority of states, Teague bears in some way on the retroactivity
analysis. Only in the smallest handful of states does Teague play no
role whatsoever. 100
Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of Constitutional
Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2008).
95. GULL Survey, supra note 14. Thanks again to Thanh Nguyen and the GULC law
library research team of summer 2015 for their help with the initial research on this.
96. Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing—Real or Imagined?, 28
FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165-66 (2016).
97. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009); see also Zorislav R. Leyderman,
Criminal Law: Minnesota Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity Standard for State PostConviction Proceedings—Danforth v. State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 315-16 (2009).
98. Ironically, in defending the importance of the finality interest, the Minnesota Supreme Court quoted not only Justice Harlan, in Mackey, but also the Florida Supreme Court,
even though Florida is one of the few jurisdictions that had chosen not to adopt Teague. See
Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498-99 (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)).
99. Id. at 499.
100. Alaska, Florida, Missouri, Utah, and West Virginia. See supra note 15. Moreover,
the trend has shifted towards rather than away from Teague—three states that explicitly
declined to follow Teague in 1993, now use it as the default rule: New Jersey (State v. Gaitan,
37 A.3d 1089, 1107 (N.J. 2012)); Oregon (Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 298 P.3d 59, 63 (Or. Ct.
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Several states even choose to voluntarily bind themselves to

Teague, notwithstanding their acknowledgement of Danforth’s invita-

tion to unyoke themselves from the federal regime. Some states have
done so based on the belief that it would be a “totally fruitless folly” to
devise their own rule, given “the incredibly daunting task of creating
an alternative and independent body of retroactivity doctrine in opposition to Teague v. Lane.” 101 Other states bind themselves to Teague
by inertia where lower courts are bound by pre-Danforth decisions, but
the state’s highest court has yet to reconsider the issue postDanforth. 102 Yet other states first apply Teague to assure themselves
that federal law does not require retroactivity, using Teague to set a
floor, and only after determining that federal law does not mandate
retroactive relief, do they proceed to apply a separate state retroactivity regime to decide whether they nonetheless want to be more generous on state grounds.103 There are even states that go so far as to use
Teague as a retroactivity rule not only for federal constitutional decisions, but also to assess whether a retroactive remedy is available in
post-conviction proceedings when state law changes. 104
Most states use Teague as a nonbinding standard. In the words of
the Idaho Supreme Court, they recognize that they are “not required
to blindly follow [the Supreme Court’s] view of what constitutes a new
rule or whether a new rule is a watershed rule,” and instead can “give
retroactive effect to a rule of law,” using “independent judgment, based
upon the . . . ‘uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our longstanding jurisprudence.’ ” 105 But even when states explicitly recognize
Teague as non-binding, anchoring effects induce states to follow the
Supreme Court’s lead in most cases.
App. 2013)); and South Dakota (Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731, 742-43 (S.D. 2014)). Compare with the discussion of those three states in Hutton, supra note 81, at 462-64.
101. See Miller v. State, 53 A.3d 385, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (declining to apply
Padilla retroactively); see also People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959 (Colo. 2015).
102. See, e.g., Drach v. Bruce, 136 P.3d 390 (Kan. 2006); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227
(N.H. 2014); State v. Alshaif, 724 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); Burleson v. Saffle, 46 P.3d
150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189 (R.I. 2008); State v. White, 944
A.2d 203 (Vt. 2007); State v. Walker, 756 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
103. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Maxon when declining to
apply Padilla retroactively, first took a Teague analysis to ensure that federal law did not
require a retroactive remedy and then applied its own version of the Linkletter/Stovall test.
759 N.W.2d 817, 820-22 (Mich. 2008).
104. E.g., Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009); Thompson v. State,
625 A.2d 299, 300-01 (Me. 1993); Odegard v. State, 767 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
105. Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (Idaho 2010) (quoting State v. Donato, 20 P.3d 5,
8 (Idaho 2001)); see also, e.g., Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 843 (Conn. 2015)
(“[W]hile federal decisions applying Teague may be instructive, this court will not be bound
by those decisions in any particular case, but will conduct an independent analysis and application of Teague.”).
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Several states that use Teague as a nonbinding starting point, however, treat it as a framework to be tweaked, rather than a roadmap to
be strictly followed and explicitly state that they are applying Teague
on their own terms. These states critique the Supreme Court for its
ever-expanding understanding of what constitutes a new rule, or its
crabbed definition of what constitutes a watershed rule of criminal
procedure, or both. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, for example,
held Padilla retroactive after the Supreme Court refused to do so in
Chaidez, and in so doing, adopted an earlier variant of the Teague
framework that existed before the Court broadened the definition of a
‘new rule’ in the 1997 Lambrix decision to include whether it was “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” 106 “Although [it] consider[ed] the retroactivity framework established in Teague to be sound in principle,”
the Massachusetts court explained:
[T]he Supreme Court’s post-Teague expansion of what qualifies as a
“new” rule has become so broad that “decisions defining a constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review. . . .”
[W]e continue to adhere to the Supreme Court’s original construction
that a case announces a “new” rule only when the result is “not dictated by precedent.” 107

In Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction,108 the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Miller v. Alabama 109 was a watershed rule
of criminal procedure. This determination of watershed importance
was justified on the basis that the pre-Miller use of a mandatory sentencing regime created too high a risk of a disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In contrast, allowing a
sentencing judge full discretion yields the needed accuracy in sentencing procedures to avoid this risk. 110 That Connecticut court also recognized that the Miller rule did not fall easily into substantive or procedural exceptions to Teague and that most state courts that had found
Miller retroactive had categorized it as a substantive exception notwithstanding its procedural elements.111 The Connecticut Supreme
Court exercised its autonomy in announcing that Miller was a water-

106. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 769 (Mass. 2013) (quoting Lambrix v.
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)).
107. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463
(Nev. 2003)).
108. 115 A.3d 1031 (Conn. 2015).
109. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
110. Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1041-42.
111. Id. at 1040.
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shed procedural rule, even though the Teague procedural exception remains a nullity under federal law. 112 Missouri has also found the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona retroactive under its own
retroactivity regime, and did so pre-Danforth. 113 The year after the
State v. Whitfield decision, the Supreme Court refused to give retroactive effect to the same rule when applying Teague. 114
Such maverick decisions, however, remain the exceptions that
prove the rule. Given the heaviness of Teague’s shadow, it is much less
likely for states to grant retroactive relief for a new federal rule after
the Supreme Court has already denied retroactive relief under Teague.
Whether or not the rule announced in Padilla v. Kentucky 115 (that IAC
claims can be brought during deportation proceedings) should be retroactive is one example. Most states have, like the Supreme Court did
in Chaidez, denied retroactivity to this decision, which expanded the
scope of IAC claims to include bad advice on the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.116 Only Massachusetts, while working within
the Teague framework, broke from the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of a new rule to hold Padilla retroactive after Chaidez.117 Interestingly, although many of these states decided the Padilla issue before the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez, the Chaidez court did
not cite any of the state decisions (or distinguish those concluding Padilla should apply retroactively) in its reasoning. 118

112. Id. at 1041.
113. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
114. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).
115. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
116. States denying retroactive relief for the rule announced in Padilla before the Supreme
Court ruled in Chaidez include: Arizona (State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)),
Georgia (State v. Sosa, 733 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 2012)), Michigan (People v. Gomez, 820 N.W.2d 217
(Mich. Ct. App. 2012)), Minnesota (Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 2012)), New Jersey
(State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089 (N.J. 2012)), Oregon (Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 298 P.3d 59 (Or.
Ct. App. 2013)), and Tennessee (Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011–02068–CCA–R3–PC, 2012 WL
4470675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2012)). New Mexico granted retroactive relief before the
Supreme Court ruled in Chaidez in Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240 (N.M. 2014). Other states,
like Connecticut in Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829 (Conn. 2015); Nebraska, in
State v. Osorio, 837 N.W.2d 66 (Neb. 2013); New York, in People v. Baret, 16 N.E.3d 1216 (N.Y.
2014); Ohio, in State v. Bishop, 7 N.E.3d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014); and Texas, in Ex parte De
Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) followed the Supreme Court’s lead in
Chaidez in denying relief. The dissenting opinion in Baret criticizes the majority for declining
to accept Danforth’s invitation, and “instead applying Teague in lock-step with the Supreme
Court.” Baret, 16 N.E.3d at 1233; see also Kate Lebeaux, Note, Padilla Retroactivity on State
Law Grounds, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1651 (2014).
117. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Mass. 2013) (concluding that under
its own application of the Teague exceptions, Padilla did not announce a new rule and was
therefore retroactively applicable on collateral review).
118. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
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Similarly, before the Supreme Court finally resolved the issue in

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 119 the states were fairly evenly divided over

whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of mandatory life without parole for juveniles (the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama)
should apply retroactively, and if so, why. Courts in eleven states had
held that Miller is retroactively available in collateral proceedings, the
majority concluding that it is a substantive rule. 120 Although Connecticut, as detailed above, deemed it a Teague watershed exception.121
Florida and Missouri concluded it was retroactive after applying their
own variants of a Linkletter/Stovall three-part test. 122 At least five
states applying Teague denied retroactivity, deeming Miller a non-retroactive procedural rule.123 When the Supreme Court finally stepped
into the fray and resolved the issue with its decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, it ruled in a form binding upon all state courts that Miller
was a substantive rule requiring retroactive application. 124
The case presented the opportunity for the Supreme Court (foregone in Chaidez) to engage in a dialogue with the state courts on the
Miller retroactivity analysis, a type of “polyphonic federalism” where
the fact that the states had gotten ahead of the Supreme Court on the
issue generated a more engaged debate.125
119. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
120. See In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Morfin, 981
N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270
(Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716
(Neb. 2014); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C.
2014); Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d
487 (Wyo. 2014) (after applying Teague by the parties’ consent). As described in Robert S.
Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 95 (2016), some states have also
resolved the issue legislatively by abolishing mandatory LWOP juvenile sentencing regimes
and making that legislative fix retroactive.
121. Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1041 (Conn. 2015).
122. In Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), a district court of appeals
in Florida declared Miller non-retroactive under that state’s standard. This decision is no longer
good after Montgomery has been quashed. See Geter v. State, 177 So. 3d 1266 (Table) (Fla.
2015). Missouri, in contrast, held Miller retroactive under its own retroactivity regime. Although the reasoning is different than that of the Supreme Court in Montgomery, this decision
can stand. See Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 160718 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13,
2015). Some states have also resolved the issue legislatively by abolishing mandatory life without parole (LWOP) juvenile sentencing regimes and making that legislative fix retroactive.
123. The following state courts held that the Miller rule was procedural and non-retroactive, all decisions that are no longer good law under Montgomery v. Louisiana: Ex parte
Williams, 183 So. 3d 220 (Ala. 2015); People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959 (Colo. 2015); Chambers v.
State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013); Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629 (Mont. 2015); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013).
124. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016).
125. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
243, 288 (2005) (arguing that overlap of state and federal power provides “a valuable opportunity for dialogue,” as can be seen, for example, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)), which
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In sum, the shadow of Teague looms disturbingly large in state
court proceedings, notwithstanding Danforth’s invitation to cast aside
this federal statute-specific limitation on the availability of a remedy
for constitutional violations, a limitation that is grounded largely in
inapposite comity concerns. The failure of state courts to unyoke themselves from Teague is understandable, perhaps given the difficulties of
forging a new path. Whether legal rules are retroactive presents a complicated question that has perplexed legal scholars for centuries, and
generated scores of articles and conflicting Supreme Court decisions.
Unthinking bright lines are easy to implement, and the seeming path
of least resistance is to apply the same framework used by the
federal courts.
But there are structural constitutional concerns at issue here that
counsel strongly against following Teague. Basic principles of equity,
social justice, and pragmatism, too, offer good reasons to eschew blind
adherence to Teague given that much, if not all, of the underpinnings
of that decision have no bearing in the context of state post-conviction
proceedings. Under certain (if not all) circumstances, state habeas
courts must provide relief precisely because federal habeas courts will
not. Otherwise, litigants will lack any forum to vindicate their constitutional rights, particularly for those claims that are not truly “final”
until after at least one round of post-conviction proceedings.126
As Justice Anstead of the Supreme Court of Florida (one of the few
states that chose not to follow Teague) has observed, as federal habeas
protections dissolve, the more important the role of state post-conviction review in the constitutional scheme becomes:
It would make little sense for state courts to adopt the Teague analysis when a substantial part of Teague’s rationale is deference to a
state’s substantive law and review. If anything, the more restrictive
standards of federal review place increased and heightened importance upon the quality and reliability of the state proceedings.
In other words, if the state proceedings become the only real venue
for relief, as they in fact have become, it is critically important that
reflected on the diverse experience of state courts interpreting their own constitutions to
forbid prohibiting homosexual sex); see also id. at 302-03 (discussing how Article III standing
limits prevent vindication of federal rights in federal courts, but state courts are not so limited and provide an alternative forum for vindication of federal rights).
126. In doing so, it will be important to distinguish concepts of waiver and forfeiture, etc.,
in cases where there has been a voluntary relinquishment of the opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate through litigation choices, from instances where the petitioner had no previous opportunity to raise the claim because it had not yet been discovered. Erica Hashimoto addresses
this in her article on how the Teague bar is the only barrier to habeas relief not grounded in
equity and proposes a substitute rule that sounds in equitable principles, taking account of
waiver and forfeiture problems but providing retroactive relief otherwise. See Erica Hashimoto,
Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 142 (2014).
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the state courts provide that venue and “get it right” since those
proceedings will usually be the final and only opportunity to litigate
collateral claims. In fact, it is the presumed heightened quality of
state proceedings that allows the federal courts to defer to the state
proceedings as adequate safeguards to the rights of state prisoners.
To then further restrict the state proceedings would undermine the
entire rationale for restricting federal proceedings because of the reliability of state proceedings. 127

Justice Anstead’s point that state courts have no warrant to blindly
follow Teague is well taken, and echoes the basic logic that informs
Danforth. But, it can be taken even further. As I argue below, the Supreme Court’s retroactivity decisions in Teague nonetheless matter a
great deal in the state court analysis—not as a default regime to woodenly follow—but rather as a spur to action, an oppositional lodestar if
you will. It is precisely when a claim is Teague-barred in federal habeas that state courts should be prompted to more seriously consider
relief, so as to ensure that at least one forum is available to vindicate
constitutionally protected rights. A federal Teague bar, in other words,
should serve not as a blindly followed restraint, but as a call to retroactive action in state court.

C. Why State Courts Should (and Sometimes Must) Free Themselves from Teague’s Constraints
Henry M. Hart famously observed in 1953 that, “we really would be
sunk,” if the state courts failed to fulfill their role in “the scheme of the
Constitution . . . [as] the primary guarantors of constitutional rights,
and in many cases . . . the ultimate ones,” in circumstances where
“Congress ha[s] taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
and been upheld in doing so.” 128 The Supreme Court’s draconian enforcement of the Teague retroactivity bar, especially when combined
with AEDPA’s piled-on restrictions of federal habeas review, arguably
pose precisely such circumstances. State courts, in other words, just
might have occasion to become “holier than the pope,” 129 in providing
post-conviction opportunities to review constitutional claims that
would be otherwise barred by Teague in federal court. This is particularly true for those claims that do not become truly final until after
direct appeal is concluded, what I call here ‘initial collateral review
127. Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 863 (Fla. 2005).
128. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).
129. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 154 (1970) (arguing that although state courts could in theory
be more generous than federal courts in providing post-conviction relief, there was no need
for them to be “holier than the pope”).
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claims.’ Even apart from this class of claims where retroactivity in
state collateral proceedings is required by structural constitutional
concerns, there are compelling reasons that the default rule should be
one of full retroactivity. Finality qua finality is an insufficient reason
to deny retroactive relief when there are credible claims of constitutional error resulting in a punishment greater than that authorized
by law. 130

1. Circumstances Where State Habeas Courts Must Provide a
Retroactive Remedy
My first claim is strong but narrow: in some circumstances, state
courts not only can, but must, apply rules that the Supreme Court has
deemed ‘new’ and thus ineligible for federal habeas relief retroactively.
Failure to do so would violate Article III’s guarantee that at least one
forum be provided for the full and fair vindication of a federal constitutional right. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago, “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” 131

130. The argument might be made that state court judges are less able to fairly vindicate
constitutional rights than their federal counterparts, because federal judges are “as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible.” Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (1977). But where, as here, they are also straitjacketed—
not only by the text of AEDPA itself, but by the Supreme Court’s ever-more crabbed interpretations of that statute—state courts may provide the only available, and therefore preferable, forum to afford constitutionally required relief. Although a majority of state courts
have some form of electoral process to select their judges, see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015), thirty-nine states, and judges in those states, are therefore arguably
more subject to majoritarian pressures. State courts also remain the last resort for state
prisoners to pursue (and develop) new constitutional claims in post-conviction proceedings,
absent waiver of the Teague bar by the state defendant in federal habeas proceedings—a
rare occurrence. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) (citing cases of Teague
waivers). Such state court willingness to be more generous than their federal counterparts
in providing relief is not unimaginable, particularly given the wave of reforms on the front
end of resolving the mass incarceration crisis, including abolishing mandatory minimums
and truth in sentencing laws (reforms that are supported by the right and left alike) and the
recognized mass incarceration crisis. See, e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN & RUTH DELANEY,
PLAYBOOK FOR CHANGE? STATES RECONSIDER MANDATORY SENTENCES, VERA INSTITUTE FOR
JUSTICE (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/mandatorysentences-policy-report-v2b.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CM8-J39Z]. It is conceivable that the
winds have changed. Elected state court judges could arguably begin to face greater pressure
to resist draconian sentencing regimes, and favor earlier release, particularly for those who
are serving unconstitutional sentences or who have been convicted based on constitutional
error. It may be that state jurists will be more generous in providing retroactive relief precisely because state legislators are also engaging in active “front-end” reforms to eliminate
draconian mandatory sentencing schemes, for example. This issue can be addressed in future
empirical work.
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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The rules that fall into this category are those like the ‘new’ ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) rule announced in Padilla, which
present claims that can only be fairly adjudicated for the first time
after the case is “final”—that is, direct appeal is concluded. It is also
possible to conceive of other sorts of claims that can be heard only in
post-conviction proceedings—such as certain types of Brady claims
involving prosecutorial misconduct on appeal or claims specifically
related to abuse of appellate processes—that, if covered by procedural rules confirmed only after the conviction, would be Teaguebarred in federal habeas courts. For such claims, state post-conviction proceedings would stand as the only available forum to vindicate
a federal constitutional right. 132
Recent Supreme Court decisions like Martinez v. Ryan 133 and Trevino v. Thaler, 134 for example, have made increasingly clear that IAC
claims are ideally brought in post-conviction proceedings. And, as a
practical matter, state post-conviction proceedings can only be brought
after the direct appeal, typically handled by the original counsel of record, is concluded.
In Martinez, the Court held that where IAC claims must be raised
in an initial collateral proceeding under state law, a procedural default
will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims if, in the
initial review of collateral proceedings, there was no counsel or counsel
in that proceeding was ineffective. 135 Put simply, defendants are entitled to one fair shot to litigate IAC claims, and that fair shot is sometimes not possible until the direct appeal is over.
The Court reinforced this principle in Trevino, holding that where a
state’s procedural framework makes it highly unlikely for a defendant
to have a meaningful opportunity to raise on direct appeal a claim that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, the good cause exception recognized in Martinez applies.136 Together, these cases suggest
132. Although the focus of this Article is the availability of relief for state prisoners
through state post-conviction proceedings, especially when federal habeas relief is Teaguebarred, these arguments would apply with equal force to preclude Teague from barring relief
to federal prisoners that, under the current regime, would similarly have no opportunity for
full and fair litigation of certain types of IAC or other claims, in instances where the ‘new’
rule emerges after direct proceedings were finalized but before post-conviction proceedings
have begun. The Supreme Court has explicitly left open whether the Teague retroactivity
bar would apply in such a circumstance. In Chaidez, the petitioner argued that it should not,
particularly for IAC claims that are ideally (or arguably, can only be) raised after direct
appeal has been exhausted, but the Court declined to reach the question. Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013).
133. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012).
134. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013).
135. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
136. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921; see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09
(2003) (holding that federal prisoners may bring IAC claims in habeas proceedings under § 2255
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that for certain types of claims that are not truly final, meaning they
have not had a full and fair process to be litigated on direct appeal,137
the proper retroactivity rule should be that of Griffith v. Kentucky, 138
because litigants in such circumstances are similarly situated to litigants whose direct appeals are still pending. “[B]asic norms of constitutional adjudication”139 entitle them to their first bite at the apple.
Imagine a Padilla claim where a criminal defendant was improperly advised about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, but
the case became “final,” meaning direct appeal was concluded, before
Padilla was decided. Under Teague, as applied to Padilla claims in
Chaidez, there is no opportunity to bring a Sixth Amendment claim in
federal habeas proceedings. And, although Danforth allows state
courts to hear the claim in their post-conviction proceedings, as
demonstrated above, the vast majority of states follow the Supreme
Court’s lead in denying relief. The result (at least in the many states
that follow the Supreme Court’s lead): a constitutional violation that
has never been—and never even had the opportunity to be—fully and
fairly litigated because post-conviction proceedings are the first practical opportunity to present such a claim. But failure to allow even a
single opportunity to present a claim of constitutional injury is something that cannot be countenanced in a legal system that purports to
be governed by a binding Constitution. 140
Nor would earlier proponents of restrictions on habeas retroactivity, like Justice Harlan, think otherwise. Because such initial review
collateral claims are not truly “final” until after post-conviction review
has concluded, the more appropriate retroactivity rule is that of Griffith v. Kentucky, one grounded in “basic norms of constitutional adjudication,” which demands that all cases pending for similarly situated

whether or not the claim could have been raised on direct appeal, given that, collateral proceedings are the “forum best suited” for IAC claims for a variety of reasons); Rebecca Sharpless & Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2013) (making this argument).
137. Justice Harlan’s memorable ode to finality, that “[n]o one, not criminal defendants,
not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment providing a man
shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved,” Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
hinges on the last two words: “already resolved.”
138. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
139. Id. at 322.
140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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litigants receive the benefit of the ‘new’ rule. 141 The reasoning underpinning the finality and repose interests protected by Teague is, in
short, utterly inapposite when the constitutionally injured party has
not yet had an opportunity to litigate the claim.
Those who advocated for more stringent retroactivity regimes on
habeas, in the context of the Warren Court’s criminal rights revolution, all started from the basic premise that the federal habeas petitioner had already had at least one opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his or her claim in state proceedings.142 These proponents of finality recognized that reasonable jurists could and would disagree on a
platonic ‘correct’ result, creating the possibility of unending review
with no repose, as long as opportunities for challenge remained.143
They therefore saw the goal of habeas not as error correction, but rather as assurance of adequacy of process—a view that is enshrined in
AEDPA and today’s federal habeas jurisprudence. 144
But such exaltation of process, above all else, hinges on the premise
that some process has been offered. Cases such as Stone v. Powell 145
and Swaine v. Presley 146 confirm that federal habeas relief can be denied only when a full and fair alternative forum is truly available. And
although state courts may not even be constitutionally required to hold
141. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. Note too that this constitutionally mandated “equal treatment” rule of Griffith could very easily be extended to mandate full retroactive availability
of relief in collateral proceedings as well, given that it is only the vagaries of appellate practice that lead one person’s conviction to become final years before another’s, allowing two
defendants—who committed an offense on the same day, or who plead guilty on the same
day, or who were tried at the same time—to nonetheless not have the same resort to retroactive relief. The defendant whose appeal process goes more slowly is able, even under
Teague, to take advantage of a retroactive remedy (assuming the claim can be brought on
direct appeal), while the defendant who is in state proceedings that move faster, or whose
lawyer is more efficient, will be out of luck because her conviction becomes final before the
new rule is announced.
142. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 44, at 443; Mishkin, supra note 38, at 57.
143. “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
144. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
145. 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (holding that Fourth Amendment violations were not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings where “the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim”); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (proposing that the substantive scope of federal
habeas jurisdiction for search-and-seizure claims be limited “solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the
question in state courts”).
146. 430 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1977) (finding no § 2255 federal habeas review of District of
Columbia criminal convictions given the availability of collateral proceedings in the District
of Columbia and recognizing “the settled view that elected judges of our state courts are fully
competent to decide federal constitutional issues,” and that “collateral relief available in the
Superior Court is neither ineffective nor inadequate simply because the judges of that court
do not have life tenure”).
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post-conviction proceedings, or even appeals, once they do provide a
forum, that forum must be fully available to vindicate federal rights.
It follows that where there has been no prior opportunity to litigate
the federal claim in state proceedings on direct appeal, a habeas remedy is constitutionally required. The finality line drawn in Griffith
does not govern for these initial review, collateral claims. And if the
federal courts are barred from review under Teague, given the arbitrary drawing of a finality line at the conclusion of direct appeal proceedings, even when the claim in question is not truly final, the state
courts must step in.147
To be sure, instances where ‘new’ procedural rules barred by
Teague can be heard only in post-conviction proceedings are likely
rare. Until Chaidez so characterized the Padilla rule, there were over
three decades of Supreme Court decisions addressing IAC claims,148
yet the Supreme Court had never concluded that they created new
rules. Instead the Court concluded that such claims involved applications of foreseeable evolution of settled doctrine.149 And to my
knowledge, the Court has yet to hold that a case enforcing Brady’s prohibition against prosecutorial misconduct constitutes a new rule that
would be Teague-barred, versus an application of existing precedent. 150
147. State courts may not even be constitutionally required to hold post-conviction proceedings, or even appeals, as found in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1987),
although the ruling in Montgomery casts some doubt on that proposition. See Vazquez &
Vladeck, supra note 93, at 910. In all events, it is settled law that once state courts do provide
a forum, that forum must be available to vindicate federal rights. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (finding that the policy of the federal law is the prevailing policy in
every state); Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 222-25 (1908) (finding relief for federal
violations must be available in state court, especially when precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment in federal court); see also Mondou v. N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 5657 (1912) (“[W]e deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes
of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction
as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with
those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under
the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure.”). Moreover, Vazquez and Vladeck, in their forthcoming piece on Montgomery v. Louisiana, make the argument that the import of the Court’s decision is that state courts are
now constitutionally required to provide post-conviction relief. See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 93, at 937.
148. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 65; see Brief of Petitioner at 16, Chaidez
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820).
149. This does not mean, of course, that such claims will necessarily prevail. Precisely
because IAC claims are predicated on the already deferential Strickland standard, it is very
difficult for a federal court, constrained by AEDPA deference, to reverse a state court on the
merits. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
150. Note also that these claims are likely to present not only retroactivity problems, but
statute of limitation problems where the question of untimeliness may or may not be resolved
through AEDPA’s exceedingly narrow “newly discovered evidence” window—if they involve
guilt. Brady sentencing claims, however, would have no recourse. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)
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New rule problems, moreover, will ultimately time out: at some point
any new rule becomes an old one as future cases come down the pike
and new litigants are able to take advantage of already existing rules.
Yet even if few and far between, when initial review collateral claims
present themselves, there are solid arguments that state courts should
follow the Griffith rule rather than the Teague rule. The reasoning behind any opposing argument does not withstand scrutiny, given that
it is predicated solely on finality interests that have no bearing.151
A solitary footnote in Greene v. Fisher, moreover, raises the specter
of another class of cases where state courts would have the structural
constitutional obligation to review claims that Congress has deprived
the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review. 152 There, Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the Third Circuit’s denial of federal habeas relief, holding that AEDPA’s deployment of the
term “clearly established Federal law” is limited to the Supreme
Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudication
on the merits, and not when the decision was truly final (with the expiration of the period for seeking Supreme Court review from the direct appeal). 153 But the Court also noted that “[w]hether § 2254(d)(1)
would bar a federal habeas petitioner from relying on a decision that
came after the last state-court adjudication on the merits, but fell
within one of the exceptions recognized in Teague . . . is a question we
need not address to resolve this case.”154
If the Court were to hold that AEDPA effectively repealed the Teague
exceptions (something I even hesitate to utter, like he-who-shall-not-benamed, for fear of bringing the possibility to life), then state courts
would be the only forum available to provide the due process protections
that underpin the Teague exceptions themselves. Here too, state courts
would be required to fulfill their role in the constitutional scheme as the
‘ultimate guardians’ of constitutional rights.155

(providing an AEDPA limitation on second and successive federal habeas claims against
those who “establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would
have found the movant guilty of the offense” which by its terms precludes sentencing claims).
151. See Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475
(2013) (making a similar argument).
152. 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 n.* (2011).
153. Id. at 45; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This of course further illustrates the arbitrariness
of setting a moment in time that determines whether a rule is new or old. See the opening
example in Entzeroth, supra note 39.
154. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44 n.*. Montgomery did not expressly address this open question but strongly suggests that the answer is no.
155. See Hart, supra note 128, at 1401.
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2. Why State Habeas Courts Should Provide Retroactive Relief
When a Claim Is Teague-Barred in Federal Court
My second proscriptive point is broader. I contend that state courts
would be well advised to look to the Supreme Court’s Teague rulings
not as a default rule to unquestioningly apply, but as a map of
landmines that should be studied carefully so as to avoid further damage. Recall that Teague is grounded on two fundamental concerns:
comity and finality. As Danforth recognized (as do many state courts
that rely on Teague), the comity interest that calls for deference to and
respect for the decisions of co-equal sovereigns has no bearing where
state courts exercise their role as independent sovereigns in evaluating the legality of continued detention of state prisoners.156 What state
courts following Teague fail to recognize, however, is that Teague’s
other main supporting principle—an interest in finality and repose,
and a desire to avoid the disturbance or second-guessing of state court
judgments for claims that have at least arguably been correctly decided under the then-current law—is too slim a reed upon which to
base unquestioned fealty to the Teague regime. Particularly, given
Danforth’s recognition of the law-declaring function of federal
courts, 157 it is arguable that state court rulings under the ‘old’ rule
were never correctly decided. 158
In short, even if not constitutionally required to do so, state courts
should avoid rote application of the Teague retroactivity bar. Comity
concerns are nonexistent when a sovereign is reviewing its own judgments, and finality interests are overrated, particularly in an era
where mass incarceration rates are ever more subject to criticism.
State jurists need to take an exceptionally hard look at the touted finality interests that undergird Teague—a decision that was written
before AEDPA (hence, there was no statute of limitations that separately took care of finality and repose concerns) and which predated

156. “It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of non-retroactivity was fashioned
to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal
proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S.
264, 280-81 (2008).
157. Id. at 284-88 (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinion in Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987)).
158. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1769)
(stating that the duty of a court is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound
the old one”). Under Blackstone’s declaratory approach, adopted by Danforth, a “decision
interpreted a law [and] did no more than declare what the law had always been.” Notes and
Comments, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71
YALE L.J. 907, 907 (1962).
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the shrinkage of federal habeas review, as federal courts were still examining convictions anew under the Brown v. Allen 159 standard. Unless they can independently justify a retroactivity rule that forecloses
relief even when the constitutionality of the underlying conviction or
sentence is called into serious doubt under the newly found, but always
constitutionally required rule, state courts should not default to
Teague, but should instead pursue an anti-Teague regime. The default
rule should be the availability of a remedy for a recognized constitutional wrong, unless there are independent equitable reasons to deny
it, so as to avoid entrenchment of constitutionally suspect convictions
and sentences under the proper understanding of what the Constitution has always demanded. 160
States should thus not acquiesce in Teague retroactivity restrictions
based solely on a purported finality interest (even though that is precisely what Minnesota did on remand after Danforth, and many other
states have followed suit). 161 First, much of the ‘finality’ work that
Teague had to do is now superfluous, as statutes of limitations, more
stringent procedural default rules, and bans on second and successive
petitions, etc., provide a more direct means of achieving the same
ends.162 Teague and its immediate progeny were intent on narrowly defining new rules in an era where federal habeas review was much less
deferential and other tools to cabin relief were unavailable. The flood of
federal habeas petitions that Teague was built to guard against has now
been more effectively gated by other devices, as well as state-level postconviction procedures, which can better serve these purposes.
Thus, in today’s constricted habeas regime, the goal of preserving
presumptively correct final judgments is more directly carried out by
a slew of other procedural barriers than it is by restricting the retroactive application of newly discovered constitutional rules. This is especially true for rules that, while short of satisfying Teague’s elusive
watershed exception, nonetheless cast serious doubt on the accuracy
of the underlying conviction or sentence. If a petitioner seeking habeas
relief can satisfy all the other procedural gauntlets and bring a colorable claim that her conviction or sentence is constitutionally suspect

159. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
160. Cf. Hashimoto, supra note 126, at 139 (arguing that in lieu of the absolute Teague
bar applicable to federal habeas claims, the Supreme Court should adopt three individualized
equitable exceptions that take into account the applicants’ conduct in pursuing claims, the merits of the claim and the stakes involved, and the unavailability of alternative remedies).
161. See supra Part B.2.
162. See supra Part A.2. (describing federal limits on habeas). See generally LARRY W.
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 13 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 2007/2008) (surveying state
post-conviction proceedings).
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based on a correct understanding of the law, then finality interests,
alone, provide insufficient grounds on which to deny review.163
Recall, too, that Justice Harlan’s views in Desist and Mackey (that
were ultimately adopted (and narrowed) by Justice O’Connor’s crafting of the Teague retroactivity bar) arose at a time when the federal
habeas statute had no statute of limitations, and the federal courts
were operating under the Brown v. Allen regime of de novo review for
state court legal errors. Thus, Judge Friendly, writing in 1970, urged
the cabining of federal habeas relief through more deferential review
rather than restrictions on retroactive relief. 164 In Judge Friendly’s
view, federal habeas review should be limited to claims that went to
the heart of the accuracy of proceedings or were grounded in actual
innocence.165 But once these criteria were satisfied, Judge Friendly had
no qualms in allowing retroactive application of new criminal procedural rules that would be barred under Teague today, including Confrontation Clause, jury selection, and IAC claims that are now Teaguebarred. 166 That universe of rules—where rights go to the heart of the
integrity of criminal proceedings and, therefore, should be remedied
whenever a violation is discovered—is far broader than that allowed
today by the Supreme Court. Even contemporaries pre-Teague recognized that there was no need for a high bar on retroactive relief once
other direct mechanisms to curtail habeas were in place. With reason,
decisions predicated on an erroneous reading of the Constitution
should not stand. Period.
The inevitable criticism of an approach that allows retroactivity
only for particularly serious rules is the dilemma posed when deciding
163. At least in federal habeas proceedings, a credible claim of actual innocence can excuse any procedural default or waiver based on failure to raise the claim earlier in the proceedings. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-66 (2016); McQuiggin v. Perkins,
133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998); Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). An actual innocence claim is more straightforward to make
in circumstances like Bousley or Welch, where the claim is one of substantive factual innocence, that is, a claim that the defendant did not commit the newly defined crime at all. For
procedural violations or sentencing errors, even ones of constitutional magnitude, claims of
actual innocence are more of a stretch. Therefore, procedural barriers to review could be
more intractable, unless the definition of actual innocence is relaxed, for example, to encompass claims of actual innocence of a sentence. The Supreme Court has expanded the concept
of actual innocence to embrace actual innocence of a capital sentence. See Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992). But it has yet to condone the expansion of the concept to the
non-capital sentencing context. This issue is percolating in the circuits, which are deeply
divided on the question. See, e.g., Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1148, 1148 n.1 (7th Cir.
2015); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586, 589-90 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Jones, 226 F.3d
328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).
164. Friendly, supra note 129, at 154-56.
165. Id. at 154.
166. Id. at 153-54.
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where to draw the line as to which constitutional errors are serious
enough to merit a remedy after the direct appeal has been concluded.
A more direct and obvious course that avoids the line-drawing problem
is to hold that any conviction resulting from constitutional error
should not stand.
The reasoning goes as follows: Danforth’s holding, predicated on the
Blackstonian law-declaring view of judging, recognized that the correct understanding of the Constitution is timeless, distinct from the
retroactive remedy, and always in existence.167 The Court has also
ruled that the states have an obligation to give full effect to binding
federal law, as articulated in Griffith, Montgomery, and Yates.168 The
import is that the default regime in state post-conviction proceedings
should be one of full retroactivity. Thus, if Danforth is correct that the
pronouncement of federal law is separate from the question of remedy,
then once a constitutional norm is properly identified by the Supreme
Court, the states have an obligation to enforce it in real time because
the rule was always so. This is true even if the rule is later discovered,
meaning that the underlying conviction was not correctly decided at
the time. I therefore advocate for a default regime of full retroactivity,
absent equitable reasons based on sandbagging, waiver, or other litigation conduct by the applicant that would otherwise counsel against
allowing the petitioner to benefit from the newly found rule. 169
Any asserted interest in finality qua finality, moreover, is ever more
suspect given the recognized mass incarceration crisis this country is
facing, the increasing condemnation of the carceral state, the growing
awareness of the flaws and racial bias in the criminal justice system,
and the recognition that mandatory minimum sentences are unfair
and ineffective.170 It simply makes no sense to keep people imprisoned

167. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
168. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 211-12
(1988) (pre-Teague decision authored by Justice Stevens reversing the South Carolina Supreme
Court for declining to apply a new application of an old procedural rule retroactively); Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 314-15 (1987). There are no convincing reasons why application of
a newly discovered (but always correct) procedural rule is not binding upon state post-conviction courts. The general Teague bar is not binding under Danforth, and its rationale is baseless
once in state court, given other interests that better protect finality.
169. Hashimoto, supra note 126, at 172-75 (advocating for an equitably grounded substitute for Teague that could take account of waiver and forfeiture, but otherwise allow retroactive application of newly discovered rules for those that sought relief that was wrongly
foreclosed during their direct appeal).
170. See Marc Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/how-to-lock-up-fewerpeople.html; see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2014); Michael Meranze, Pathology of the Carceral State, L.A. REV.
OF BOOKS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pathology-carceral-state/
[https://perma.cc/Y3V6-TFUD]; Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meet-
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when there are serious concerns that their constitutional rights have
been violated or when they are demonstrably serving sentences that
would be illegal if imposed today.171 Jettisoning of the federally
grounded Teague regime, for example, would allow those who were
sentenced under constitutionally suspect regimes to benefit from the
current—and always correct, per Danforth and Montgomery—understanding of what the Constitution requires. The import of this logic is
that ‘procedural rules,’ such as the Apprendi/Blakely Sixth Amendment line of cases that federal courts and most state courts have declined to apply retroactively in collateral proceedings, should not be
deemed new but rather newly discovered.172 The similarly situated litigant from Griffith, entitled to be treated similarly under constitutional norms, should, in other words, include post-conviction petitioners for relief who were never able to have their claims decided under
the correct understanding of the Constitution. 173
ing of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Attorney General Eric Holder speech], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech130812.html [https://perma.cc/AWL8-REL3] (summarizing the evolving research that mandatory minimums do not work for either rehabilitation or deterrence purposes, as well as
ongoing state sentencing reform initiatives).
171. There is an ever-growing consensus across right and left alike that long-term incarceration is neither efficient nor effective. Executive clemency programs like President
Obama’s clemency initiative that has already commuted scores of mandatory minimum drug
sentences, see Press Release, Department of Justice, Announcing New Clemency Initiative,
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Details Broad New Criteria for Applicants (Apr. 23,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative [https://perma.cc/2HRR-XM2G],
and legislative fixes, state sentencing reform, and similar clemency initiatives at the state level,
see SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra note 130, are of course alternative and more direct approaches. But these reforms on the front end do suggest that the balancing of interests could
and should be restricted by a post-conviction court in a time in which society is increasingly
suspicious of the criminal justice system. Maintaining a constitutionally suspect sentence just
for the sake of not disturbing it, and allowing vindication of a constitutional right that would
otherwise go unremedied seems increasingly unjustifiable.
172. See Jacobs, supra note 49; see also Mark S. Hurwitz, Much Ado About Sentencing:
The Influence of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 27 JUST. SYS.
J. 1, 81-93 (2006).
173. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (refusing to apply the jury right to
capital sentencing proceedings announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)), is perhaps the most glaring example. See also Shon Hopwood, Preface—Failing to Fix Sentencing

Mistakes: How the System of Mass Incarceration May Have Hardened the Hearts of the
Federal Judiciary, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2014). More positive outcomes
occurred this past term in Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v. United States, where the

Court declared the rules in question to be retroactive, and therefore retroactively applicable
during collateral proceedings. See supra note 1. States are bound to follow these decisions
under Montgomery, and to the extent that states have ACCA clones with similar residual
clauses, this issue will also arise at the state level. The federal precedent set in Welch will
be, at the least, persuasive and arguably binding. See also Beckles v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 23 (2016) (granting certiorari in a case asking whether Johnson v. United States applies
retroactively to collateral cases challenging sentences enhanced under the federal sentencing guidelines residual clause).
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Consider the following hypothetical: If Congress passed a law that
increased the punishment of those already convicted and imprisoned—
let’s say it doubled everyone’s sentences—such legislative action would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the prisoners’ convictions
were already final, because it would result in the imposition of a punishment greater than that allowed at the time of conviction.174 Yet, refusing to allow a prisoner to take advantage of governing law that has
‘found’ the correct understanding of the Constitution, and which would
lessen her sentence if applied to her situation (or, in the extreme, prevent her execution), has the same ultimate effect, just in the opposite
direction. In the first scenario, application of a new law increasing punishment violates the Constitution. In the second, the Teague regime
countenances refusal to abide by an old, but newly discovered law that
would clearly diminish punishment. The net effect, a punishment longer
than that which is constitutionally permissible, is the same.
In neither scenario does the fact that the prisoner’s conviction is already ‘final’ matter much to the fundamental question of whether a prisoner is serving a punishment more severe than that allowed by the Constitution. To be sure, the ex post facto legislative prohibitions are not
only constitutionally mandated, but grounded in fair notice and deterrence functions that are purportedly served by linking crimes to set punishments. But the strength of any ‘reliance’ interest by wrongdoers on
the nature of the punishment is dubious at best. 175 Notice rationales,
moreover, have been steadily undermined by the malleability of plea
bargains and abuses in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, etc.176
The growing wave of opposition to draconian mandatory minimums and
unyielding truth in sentencing schemes also demonstrates skepticism
about the independent value of preserving initial sentences that are today viewed as unfair and ineffective. 177 At bottom, the fundamental fairness concerns that are constitutionally protected by the Ex Post Facto
174. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798) (“The enhancement of a crime, or
penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and
therefore they may be classed together.”); see also Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072,
2088 (2013) (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits federal courts from sentencing
a defendant based on guidelines promulgated after a crime was committed, when the new
version of the guidelines provides a higher sentencing range than the version in place at the
time of the offense).
175. For general discussions of the rationales for and against retroactive relief, see Fisch,
supra note 21; Harrington, supra note 38; and Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie be Buoyed?:
Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 35, 73-74 (1997) (discussing the oddity of suggesting that there is a legitimate reliance
interest in the criminal context).
176. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
177. See Attorney General Eric Holder speech, supra note 170.
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Clause appear to be equally offended by allowing a prisoner to continue
to serve a sentence that is, under the correct understanding of the Constitution, beyond the constitutionally permissible limits.178

D. Why Defense Counsel Should Care More About State Post-Conviction Proceedings
Hypotheticals aside, while recognizing the inertial pull of Teague
and the difficulties of convincing state courts to change their course, I
nonetheless close with this practical coda, joining others who have
stressed the need for the criminal defense bar to press the battle
against Teague, and take full advantage of the potential opportunities
for relief provided in state post-conviction proceedings (and the unfettered Supreme Court review that can follow). 179
Judgments from state court post-conviction proceedings are rarely
the source of Supreme Court cases, and as a leading habeas treatise
observes, when they are, it is usually because the state, not the criminal defendant, has successfully petitioned for review. 180 But every now
and again, a state habeas petitioner gets certiorari granted from a
state post-conviction loss, which allows the law to evolve on direct review in a way that it never could on habeas review given the constraints imposed by Teague and AEDPA. 181
178. There are also strong arguments that finality interests are greatly reduced when the
challenge is to the length of the sentence rather than the underlying conviction, as questions
such as stale witnesses, etc., do not arise. See Douglas Berman, Distinguishing Finality Interests Between Convictions and Sentences, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 15, 2006, 9:51 AM),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/12/distinguishing_.html
[https://perma.cc/ETA7-V2ZD]; Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 139-40 (2012).
179. See, e.g., Shay, supra note 151, at 474. Shay calls Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309
(2012), the “Gideon for state postconviction” and makes the point that state post-conviction
proceedings both provide the best opportunity for certain federal law claims to be litigated
and act as a vehicle that provides lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, with the
cleanest opportunity, shorn of the veil of AEDPA deference, to decide open questions of federal constitutional procedure. See also, Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a

New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008) (making the unfettered review point and also noting that state defendants can choose to waive the Teague

defense in federal court, but rarely do so).
180. 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6.1, at 341-43 (6th ed. 2011).
181. It also bears noting that, under AEDPA, a federal court will only reach questions
decided by the state courts under “clearly established . . . law” and reverse such decisions
under a highly deferential standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). Teague prohibits federal
courts not only from applying new procedural rules retroactively, but also from making new
rules during habeas proceedings, thereby severely stunting the lawmaking function of the
lower federal courts. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299, 316 (1989); Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 23, at 1746-48.
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Padilla v. Kentucky,182 which expanded the boundaries of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel to encompass ineffective assistance in deportation proceedings, was one such case. In Padilla, more aggressive
pursuit of state post-conviction remedies allowed a new rule expanding
the right to counsel to evolve by the Supreme Court’s direct review of
a state post-conviction proceeding. This ruling allowed constitutional
norms to evolve, as the Supreme Court can review such legal decisions
de novo, unencumbered by AEDPA’s filters. 183 If the Padilla issue had
arisen during review of a federal habeas case, the Court would never
have reached it.
But there is a time trap for the unwary. In Lawrence v. Florida, 184
the Court held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not subject to tolling during the pendency of state post-conviction proceedings.185 In her dissent, one of the points made by Justice Ginsburg was
that this rule would pose a procedural obstacle thwarting completion
of state post-conviction proceedings through Supreme Court review,
and “unnecessarily encumber the federal courts with anticipatory filings and deprive unwitting litigants of the opportunity to pursue their
constitutional claims.” 186
Such a barrier to crafting federally uniform law on issues that can
only arise in post-conviction settings impedes the evolution of constitutional protections. Supreme Court review of state post-conviction
proceedings is arguably the only opportunity that the Court has to correct constitutional errors on those claims (like ineffective assistance
on appeal or post-appeal Brady claims) that can be litigated for the
first time only in post-conviction proceedings—the initial review collateral claims.187 This opportunity to move the law forward, one unavailable in federal habeas proceedings, cannot be overstated—nor can
the importance of seeking Supreme Court review of state post-conviction rulings, notwithstanding the procedural gauntlets that must be
overcome to do so without running afoul of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 188 The preferred course is thus to seek certiorari on the judgment
of the state post-conviction court from the Supreme Court, while simultaneously pursuing a federal habeas remedy, and then to move for a
182. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
183. Teague’s bar against making new rules on habeas is grounded, at least in part, in
Article III’s prohibitions against advisory opinions, which may be inapposite in many states.
See Schapiro, supra note 125, at 302-04.
184. 549 U.S. 327 (2007).
185. Id. at 337.
186. Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. See also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(dissenting on the importance of state post-conviction review).
188. 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 180, at 343.
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stay of the federal proceedings pending resolution of the state action.
As Justice Ginsburg observed in Lawrence, this is of course unnecessarily cumbersome and burdensome on litigants and courts alike.189
But, I would argue, it is worth the effort to ensure that the law continues to evolve, or be rightly ‘discovered.’
State courts, moreover, as the ‘ultimate guardians’ of federal rights
in our constitutional scheme, ought to be reminded of their obligation
to fill a constitutional void left by the erosion of federal habeas relief.
To date, I am unaware of any state court decision that has expressly
considered this structural constitutional obligation in determining
whether to follow Teague or chart an independent course. Particularly
for those state courts that have yet to rule on whether Teague applies
(about one-third of jurisdictions), a viable litigation strategy would be
to propose an “anti-Teague” regime of full retroactivity, absent equitable reasons precluding relief, precisely because federal courts offer no
forum. Fundamental to our constitutional structure is the principal
that every right demands a remedy. 190
In sum, seeking certiorari of state post-conviction rulings provides
the best clean shot for development of new constitutional rules governing post-conviction procedures. State post-conviction proceedings may
also provide the last clear shot of adding to the factual record.191 Aggressive pursuit of retroactive relief in state post-conviction proceedings—including pressing the arguments that state statute of limitations and other procedural bars are better suited to serve finality interests than arbitrary retroactivity restrictions designed for another
purpose—may also, with the arc of history, provide the basis for the
Supreme Court to rethink the Teague bar, or at the very least, become
less stingy with respect to the Teague exceptions.
That over half the states had held that the rule announced in Miller
v. Alabama (that juveniles could not be constitutionally sentenced to
mandatory life without parole) should be given retroactive effect before
the Supreme Court even ruled in Montgomery could not have escaped
189. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 343-45.
190. On the flip side, I would strongly advocate against any concession by a petitioner in
state post-conviction proceedings that Teague governs, as was the case, for example, in State
v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 499 (Wyo. 2014).
191. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410-11 (2011), which held that review under
AEDPA is limited to the record that was before the state court which ruled on the claim on the
merits, reinforces the importance of building a complete record in state post-conviction proceedings. See also In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def.
Ass’n of Phila., et al., 790 F.3d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 2015) (approving the use of federal public
defenders in state post-conviction relief appeals in an opinion questioning why Pennsylvania
would see a problem with additional resources from the federal government, given the importance of such procedures in building the correct record for subsequent federal review).
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the notice of the Court, when Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority
confirming the same as a matter of now-binding federal law.192 State
courts can serve as working laboratories to demonstrate, through their
evolving considered practice, that allowing habeas petitioners to benefit from the increasing recognition of constitutional protections that
cast doubt on the legality of their convictions and sentences is not only
fundamentally fair, but also practically achievable.

192. Although the Montgomery majority opinion did not cite any state court rulings in support of its holding that Miller was a substantive rule, there was ample briefing in the case
from states on both sides of the issue. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/XN3H-3U3K].

